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Abstract—Provenance is derivative journal information about
the origin and activities of system data and processes. For a highly
dynamic system like the cloud, provenance can be accurately
detected and securely used in cloud digital forensic investigation
activities. This paper proposes watchword oriented provenance
cognition algorithm for the cloud environment. Additionally time-
stamp based buffer verifying algorithm is proposed for securing
the access to the detected cloud provenance. Performance anal-
ysis of the novel algorithms proposed here yields a desirable
detection rate of 89.33% and miss rate of 8.66%. The securing
algorithm successfully rejects 64% of malicious requests, yielding
a cumulative frequency of 21.43 for MR.
Index Terms—Cloud computing, provenance detection, empir-
ical evaluation, cloud security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Provenance is derivative journal data that represents factual
information about events executed on particular operations
at the application layer. Cloud computing is the dynamic
provisioning of resources from a shared resource pool and
needs provenance to ensure integrity and accountability of
cloud services. Provenance information journals of various real
life cloud applications is required during digital investigation.
At the same time, the cloud provenance needs to be tamper-
proof to increase acceptability of the data to Digital Forensic
Experts. Hence detection and securing of provenance in the
cloud is of significant importance for Security Intelligence.
Capturing provenance for Software as a Service (SaaS)
applications is an important research issue, since those are
dynamic in nature and have volatile attributes. Also, a large
number of virtual and physical machines are involved in
the cloud and application layer provenance needs to be col-
lected for those for Cloud Security Intelligence. In addition
effectively securing the cloud virtual machine (vm) instance
that stores provenance using time-stamp based access control
has not been considered for cloud environments [1]. More
precisely, the following research issues need to be addressed.
1) Novel algorithms using watchword capabilities to detect
provenance in the cloud at the application level of SaaS.
2) Algorithms to tamper-proof the detected provenance
using time-stamp based access control and analyzing
performance of those in terms of authorized access
acceptance and rejection.
Existing mechanisms for provenance cognition in the cloud
are not suitable as large volume of data needs to be analyzed,
thereby increasing the overhead of the system and slowing
down the cloud processes. Framework for provenance detec-
tion in the cloud through matching the patterns of journal files
to determine system level provenance has been proposed in
[2]. The provenance was analyzed for detection of malware
threats to the system. However, the integrity of the captured
provenance has not been ensured through tamper-proofing
mechanisms. The importance of ensuring cloud accountability
is a prime factor for widespread acceptance of cloud among
the public as identified in [3]. Methods to secure the cloud data
has been proposed through layer-based encryption mechanism.
However, the importance of securing the cloud provenance
meta-data to aid in digital forensic investigation has been
analyzed to a limited extent.
Based on the research questions identified above, this paper
proposes methods to detect provenance at the application layer
and securing those through time-stamp based access control.
Provenance at the application layer of SaaS consists of data
such as access-id, time of access, pages viewed, and files
modified in terms write operations. The proposed algorithm
captures the provenance described above using watchword
capability of cloud journals that triggers data insertions into
a specific cloud vm-instance using the provenance rules. The
rules are used to capture provenance at the application level of
cloud where the SaaS modules are deployed. Active-threaded
methodology captures provenance at real time through effec-
tive monitoring of the cloud vm-instances.
Algorithms called ObProv and Auditor have been pro-
posed in this paper to ensure provenance cognition and ver-
ification at the application layer of the cloud. Six real-life
applications namely Inventory Management (IM), Accounting
Management (AM), Human Resource Management (HRM),
Office Document Management (ODM), Sales Management
(SM), Customer Relationship Management (CRM) softwares
running on OpenStack cloud were tested for provenance
cognition using ObProv. The applications were implemented
as SaaS in 88 vm-instances. Next Auditor algorithm was
implemented on the storage vm-instance that measured the
request body in the buffer array and checked constraints
through access time-stamp matching.
The performance of the proposed algorithms have been
evaluated in real life cloud environment, running the specific
applications in commercial use over vm-instances. Provenance
were captured for those at a Success Rate (SR) of 89.33% and
Miss Rate (MR) of 8.66%. The mean Rejection Rate (RR) of
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64% requests achieved using Auditor algorithm out of 357 re-
quests made to access the provenance cloud vm-instance. The
cumulative frequency of 21.43 was achieved after empirical
analysis. Additionally, 65 requests were considered legitimate
and granted access to the stored provenance whereas 292
illegitimate requests were rejected by the Auditor algorithm.
II. RELATED WORK
A process aware approach to worm attacks and contam-
ination have been designed, implemented and evaluated in
[4]. The authors identified the important issue that provenance
un-awareness leads to problems in quick and accurate iden-
tification of worm attack point [4]. Process coloring can be
assigned to uniquely identify processes, it is inherited by the
child processes and diffused through process actions.
Process coloring enables fast identification of worm break in
point and naturally partitions log data based on colors, thereby
ensuring rapid identification [5], [6]. The main contribution of
the authors is to effectively reduce the volume of log data
that need to be analyzed for worm identification. Nevertheless
tamper-proofing the captured provenance was unaddressed.
Identified security as an important issue that decelerates the
widespread growth of cloud computing [7]. Complications for
data privacy and data protection have plagued the market of
the cloud. The assurance of data integrity is a necessity to
ensure acceptance of cloud services in all sectors. The authors
suggested a new model that extends the existing model in
this regard. However the new model should not threaten the
features of the existing model.
Cloud service users need to be vigilant about the security
breaches that can occur in the cloud [7]. The authors have
identified critical security issues due to the nature of service
delivery model in the cloud. They have contributed to the
cloud research field by identifying critical research questions
regarding cloud security. The authors did not identify any
malware related vulnerability, neither did their survey bring
about any real life scenarios.
The different security and vulnerability assessment in cloud
computing environment have been assessed in [8]. Experi-
ments were carried out in three environments that include
the applications residing on the same laboratory where the
targets are, residing not in the same laboratory but on the
same campus, and residing off-campus. Suitable scan tools
are applied to the servers to assess what test was applicable.
Next the captured vulnerabilities were collected and assessed
for risk.
Risk was determined through the relative assessment to
the facility in terms of the expected effect on each critical
asset [8]. The authors provided experimental evidence on
cloud computing on the basis of centralized and de-centralized
architectures. The scope of identifying threats through analysis
of provenance data have been covered to a limited extent.
III. PROPOSED METHODODLOGY
Figure 1 identifies the flow of sequence to ensure prove-
nance security. The user can access a cloud application through
a browser or may request some data file in the cloud storage.
The data is stored in the Cin and provenance is collected from
those using the ProvCapsule algorithm. Next the provenance
file containing the time (t), source vm-id (svm), target vm-
id (tvm) and date are stored in the provenance file which is
then encrypted by PO using its private key. PO generates a
private/public key pair and shares it with Auditor process.
The proposed Auditor process receives key K1 from PO and
provides its own public key K2 to PO.
The second level of encryption is carried out by the auditor
and the provenance file is sent to the signature process for
verification. If the time-stamp, source vm, target vm and
date matches, it will be forwarded to the Provenance Store,
otherwise it will be discarded and the PO and Auditor will
both be notified about the issue.
One fundamental difference with the existing research is that
the procedures used for signing and verifying provenance in-
formation are time consuming since the authorization process
is manual [9]. However, active-threading technique is proposed
here for binding provenance with the original data file in real
time, thus the process of forging provenance ownership is
prevented in the proposed framework through real-time bind-
ing of provenance meta-data to original data. The proposed
methodology also reduces time and low-overhead since only
critical information like time-stamp, date, target vm and source
vm are contained in the provenance file unlike detection of
detailed meta-data.
A. ObProv algorithm
The ObProv algorithm is aimed to encapsulate the prove-
nance information in a specific message body. Hence prove-
nance information produced by ObProv contains only the in-
formation needed by the Auditor algorithm or digital forensic
experts.
Algorithm 1 ObProv algorithm for capturing provenance at
the application level
1: procedure OBPROV(Msg,Mbd,g)
2: Mpr ← Req(T, Tvm, Svm, Date)
3: Mbd ← msg1,msg2, ..,msgn
4: Msg ←Mpr +Mbd
5: A[x]← 0
6: g ← 0
7: while g <= sizeof(Msg) do
8: A[g] =Msg
9: g = g + 1
10: ObProv ← ProvOwnerc, d
11: end while
12: If len.Msg < len.Mpr, then
13: Msg ← len.Req(T, Tvm, Svm, Date)
14: g = g+1;
15: return Provenance information file Msg
16: end procedure
The Msg is a function that will encapsulate the captured
provenance information of ProvOCal into a specific prove-
Fig. 1. Sequence of actions and processes to secure provenance information
nance message. At the same time users are allowed to specify
what type of provenance information they want to obtain
and encapsulate. The Mbd consists of the message body. The
variable g keeps the length of the size of the provenance
information and messages produced by the algorithms, and
also acts like a counter. The array A[x] consists of the
messages that are stored as strings together with the timestamp
T . The timestamps are used to compare the authenticity
of the requests in the later algorithm. The request body
Req(T, Tvm, Svm, Date) ensures that the critical provenance
information are specified by the digital forensic experts.
The contents are T, Tvm, Svm, Date to represent time, vm-
id, storage allocated for the vm and date of access respectively.
Next the message Msg is placed in the array A[g] in the
location identified by the current value of g. At the same time
ProvOwner is read from ProbCapsule and placed in the
owner variable of ObProv. Finally the Msg is assigned to
the Req body and sent to Auditor algorithm for verification.
The algorithms discussed above function in line to detect
system level provenance, at the same time those are synchro-
nized to ensure proper activity from provenance cognition, to
secured provenance encryption. The next algorithm ensures
that unauthorized access to the stored provenance is restricted.
Hence there is a sequence of two algorithms that work closely
to achieve secured provenance of the big data stored in the
cloud.
B. Auditor algorithm
The Auditor of the process is responsible for verifying the
request on the basis of the timestamps. The variable R1 and
R2 are used to measure the size of the buffer array and at the
same time implement the check constraint that it is under the
limit of the initial consideration. Both variables are initialized
to 0 to ensure that it can be used as a counter function.
The two variables R3 and R4 are used to store the times-
tamps of two consecutive messages. The times of arrival of the
new request is matched with the time when the first request
Algorithm 2 Auditor algorithm for setting permission for
provenance access through timestamp authentication
1: procedure AUDITOR(R1,R2,R3,R4,ObProv,size)
2: R1 ← 0
3: R2 ← 0
4: Peri ← 0
5: size← 1000
6: Buf [size]← ObProv
7: while R1 <= sizeof(Buf [size]) do
8: while R2 <= sizeof(Buf [size]) do
9: R1 = sizeof(Buf [size] +Msg)
10: R2 ← En.(Req(T, Tvm, Svm, Date))
11: R1 = R1 + 1
12: end while
13: end while
14: while R3 <= sizeof(Buffer[size]) do
15: while R4 <= sizeof(Buffer[size]) do
16: R3 ← timetoread.Buffer[size]
17: R4 ← timeofarrival.Buffer[size]
18: If R1 = R3 and
19: If R2! = R4
20: Peri = 1
21: else Peri=0
22: end while
23: end while
24: end procedure
if made. At the same time the vm-instance id that is making
the request is also recorded. After encryption the provenance
information must be stored at the secured end of the trusted
Auditor.
Algorithms and framework of the trusted model discussed
above are explained in this section. At the same time exper-
iments to test the effectiveness of the proposed provenance
securing algorithms are conducted with real life cloud envi-
ronment using OpenStack Essex. Finally Auditor algorithm
Fig. 2. Transitions and checks from one state to another in the proposed architecture
is implemented at the end of the trusted body to ensure
provenance persistency and achieve data integrity.
The two timestamps of the requests do not meet even in the
case that the vm-id of those matches since the Peri will be
set to 0. Additionally the permission to access the provenance
information will not be allowed because the mismatch of
timestamp is caused by a different vm-id philishing the identity
of an authorized vm [10]. The difference in the timestamp
will ensure that the vm requesting access does not have the
authorization and it is a philishing entity.
C. Security goal and assumptions
The research goal is to prevent the unauthorized or ma-
licious access and nefarious manipulation of provenance in-
formation in the cloud. The primary research issues are to
determine application level provenance of the identified SaaS
in the cloud and ensured secured access for accountability.
The assumptions for the proposed algorithms include that
the cloud environment is in Linux platform and the crypto-
graphic algorithms are implemented properly. The forensic
investigators who own and maintain the Auditor process is
trustworthy. Also, it is assumed that program scripts running
at the kernel level are not tampered by the cloud administrator.
IV. TRANSITION OF PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
The four algorithms discussed above need to communicate
with each other using message passing protocols to ensure
that data is collected by one algorithm, sent for encryption
to the next and finally validated by the remaining algorithms
for digital investigation. The proposed algorithmic architecture
consists of a number of states that must be transited. At each
state proper verification mechanisms need to be implemented
Fig. 4. Success rate of ObProv compared to real-life provenance cases
to ensure that the process satisfies the requirements needed to
advance to the next phase.
The start state in Figure 2 consists of provenance informa-
tion being gathered in the request body Req(a, b, c, d) and sent
to ObProv. Next the request is sent to ProvCapsule so that
the collected provenance are encapsulated to its original data
file to sid in forensic analysis. Next the bounded provenance
and data files are sent to the encryption scheme to obtain the
data in encrypted format.
During encryption the provenance owner and Auditor pro-
vide public keys and encrypt the information with respective
private keys. The hash algorithm is implemented to ensure
the integrity of provenance information. In this paper, hashed
Fig. 3. Passing captured provenance to the vm-instance with Auditor
chain format of encryption is used as opposed to onion type
encryption to accommodate the large volume of provenance
information as generated by cloud processes and applications.
After encryption, the provenance information is sent to
the provenance storage that is maintained by the Auditor
since it is assumed that both consumers and service providers
consider the Auditor to be a trusted body. During the course
of digital investigation if provenance information is required,
it is retrieved from the storage using the specific id assigned to
provenance data objects by the proposed algorithm. However,
the obtained provenance information is still in encrypted form,
hence it is decrypted using keys from the PO and Auditor
processes for analysis [11], [12].
V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
The performance of the proposed algorithms were tested and
analyzed in real life cloud environments running OpenStack
Essex cloud. Six commercial real life applications provided
as Software as a Service (SaaS) in cloud vm-instances were
analyzed at the servers of the cloud service provider. The SaaS
applications included Inventory Management Software (IM),
Accounting Management Software (AM), Human Resource
Management Software (HRM), Office Document Management
Software (ODM), Sales Management Software (SM), Cus-
tomer Relationship Management Software (CRM) as identified
in Table I.
Acci =
(
x1, x2, · · · , xn
)
. There are a finite population
of vm-instances so the number of accepted requests is finite
as well. Hence we detect mean acceptance rate for any Xi as,
Acci =
∑Count
i=1 Acci
Count
(1)
The value can be obtained for a large number of observa-
tions n. The variance of the delays in different ranges of Global
Delays (TBD) and Inter-Message Time (IMT ) is given by,
S2(n) =
∑Count
i=1 (Acci −Rej(Count))2
Count− 1 (2)
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF APPLICATION LEVEL PROVENANCE
COGNITION
App. VM-id Case Alg Det. SR (%) MR (%)
IM 10 1084 922 85.0554 14.9446
AM 13 1001 968 96.7032 3.2968
HRM 07 834 772 98.3871 1.6129
ODM 16 896 842 93.9732 6.0268
SM 22 1200 966 80.5000 19.5000
CRM 20 942 800 84.9257 15.0743
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Fig. 5. Illustration of the high SR and low MR in the proposed architecture
Individual vm-instances were allocated for each of the SaaS
applications specified and provided to cloud customers. Each
customer has multiple users accessing the applications with
their specific user names and passwords. For each customer,
specific provenance information were collected that includes
id-used to access, time and date of access, pages visited
and changes made to files in terms of write operations. The
TABLE II
MEAN REJECTS AND CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY VALUES FOR ObProv
Req. Size Count Acc. Rej. M.Delay C.freq
10-100 63 13 50
101-200 74 4 70
201-300 69 20 49 64 21.43
301-400 82 18 64
401-500 69 10 59
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Fig. 6. SR and MR with respect to vm-id in cloud
provenance were detected from the SaaS level using ObProv
algorithm and and stored in a separate cloud server running
the Auditor algorithm for a period of 3 months.
The captured provenance using ObProv algorithm were
stored in Cloud Provenance server that as Auditor algorithm
implemented on the machine using Linux platform and Post-
greSQL database. The Auditor algorithm provides authorized
access to the provenance information based on timestamp
authentication, thereby enabling the prevention of undesired
access that would otherwise obtain the provenance files and
tamper those [13]. Hence Auditor algorithm ensures tamper-
proofness of provenance information. Table II highlights the
results of provenance access acceptance and rejections by
Auditor algorithm.
VI. CONCLUSION
The paper aimed to ensure provenance cognition at the
application layer of SaaS in the cloud. At the same time algo-
rithm to ensure tamper-proofness of captured provenance using
timestamped access control have been identified. The proposed
algorithms were implemented on six real life SaaS applications
running on OpenStack cloud platform. Performance analysis
in terms of success and miss rates of the proposed algorithms
show desirable performance of the proposed algorithms.
Empirical investigation of the proposed algorithms show an
average success rate of 89.33% that is desirable compared
to industry benchmark values. The results show effective-
ness of the proposed algorithms in detection of pre-specified
provenance requirements. The Miss Rate (MR) of 8.66% that
is below 10% is another desirable attribute of the proposed
algorithms.
As stated earlier, the proposed algorithm detects and stores
provenance in a tamper-proof format, thereby ensuring the
accountability of provenance information to be used in digital
forensic investigation. Association of tamper-proof provenance
with web forensic data to yield more effective security intel-
ligence is a topic of future research interest.
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